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Abstract
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider
the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that
while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more effi -
cient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards,
amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform
off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and
even allows to maintain some of the effi ciency gains.
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1 Introduction
The Issues at hand. Nine of the ten largest fixed-line carriers in the world own a
controlling stake in a mobile operator (Dippon, 2005). Historically, these carriers entered
the mobile markets in its early stage and have kept a strong presence ever since: Today,
most incumbent operators own 100% of their mobile arms, which tend to be the largest
operator in their market. For example, in Europe 11 out of 14 horizontally-integrated
mobile operators were the leaders within their mobile market in 2012 (see the table in the
Appendix). In emerging markets, such Brazil, China and Russia, fixed-mobile integration
has also begun, with significant implications for their telecoms industry.1 In a nutshell,
today, integration between a mobile network and the fixed-line incumbent is a pervasive
and key feature of most communications markets.2
What is the impact of integration between a fixed and a mobile operator on pric-
ing incentives? Does integration provide a competitive disadvantage to non-integrated
operators? Notwithstanding the clear relevance of the problem, these questions have re-
ceived little attention in the economic literature. Most studies on network competition
and interconnection (see the surveys by Armstrong, 2002; Vogelsang, 2003; Harbord and
Pagnozzi, 2010) focus on the degree of market competition and the incentives to collude
in setting (two-way) access charges in order to relax competition. The role of integration
is still unexplored, and our paper aims to fill this gap.
In our model, we consider the effects of fixed-mobile integration in the presence of
call externalities, that is, when customers obtain a positive utility not only from making
1For example, Telefonica de Espana is moving ahead with plans to merge its Brazilian mobile and
fixed-line affi liates.
2The most notable exception is the UK, where BT sold its mobile arm O2 to Telefonica in 2005.
Until the recent merger between Orange and T-Mobile, it remained the largest mobile operator in the
UK.
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but also from receiving calls. In our model, one fixed and two mobile operators are
present. The mobile operators compete to attract one group of consumers who wish to
subscribe to a mobile network and will make calls to all networks. The fixed operator
provides access to its own group of customers, which is assumed to be separate from
those of the mobile networks.3 Since calls will be made between the different groups of
customers, new call services emerge: Consumers can make fixed-to-mobile and mobile-
to-fixed calls. Whenever a call is terminated on or originated by the fixed network,
fixed and mobile networks provide essential inputs to each other. In this setting, we
analyze the pricing incentives for mobile-to-mobile (MTM), fixed-to-mobile (FTM) and
mobile-to-fixed (MTF) calls under both separate ownership, where all three networks are
independent of each other, and integration, when a mobile network is integrated with the
fixed network.
Our results show that in presence of integration, FTM calls to the rival mobile network
are priced significantly above marginal cost, while those to the integrated mobile network
are priced below cost. This pricing structure creates an additional disadvantage for the
non-integrated mobile network, in terms of market shares and profits, and even magnifies
any prior asymmetries. Furthermore, we also show that the integrated networks would
prefer FTM termination rates to be set at zero, while the non-integrated network would
prefer them to be high.
If remedies were to be imposed on retail prices, we find that imposing a uniform
pricing constraint on FTM prices eliminates the strategic incentives for excessive FTM
prices, while maintaining some of the effi ciency gains from integration. The alternative
remedy of imposing a functional separation obligation, in order to mimic price setting
3In two companion papers we assume that markets are not separate and consider issues such as
fixed-to-mobile substitution and bundling strategies.
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under separation, also eliminates the incentives for excessive pricing, but foregoes the
effi ciency gains that are obtained under integration.
Related literature. An important new feature in network competition models is the
analysis of retail pricing in the presence of call externalities, i.e. when customers receive
utility from receiving calls (Jeon et al., 2004; Berger, 2004 and 2005; Cambini and Valletti,
2008; Hermalin and Katz, 2011). Jeon et al. (2004) show that introducing call exter-
nalities strongly modifies pricing incentives for calls between mobile networks: On-net
calls are priced below cost in an attempt to internalize the call externality, while off-net
prices may be set significantly above cost for strategic reasons, i.e. in order to reduce the
number of calls subscribers on rival networks receive, weakening their ability to compete.
This increase in retail prices may even lead to “connectivity breakdowns”: In order to
discourage subscribers from connecting to the rival, a network has an incentive to charge
extremely high off-net call prices or off-net receiver prices. Cambini and Valletti (2008)
show that the risk of a connectivity breakdown is however much diluted when return
calls are induced (i.e., calls made and received are complements), and that breakdown is
completely eliminated if operators can set a jointly profit-maximizing reciprocal access
charge. None of these papers however deal with the presence of both mobile and fixed
networks, and integration and its impact on pricing incentives.
On the other hand, there exists an equally sizeable economic literature on the rela-
tionship between fixed and mobile telephony, see e.g. the survey by Vogelsang (2010).
Wright (2002) considers FTM calls with a focus on mobile termination rates, while others
(e.g. Valletti and Houpis, 2005) analyze how socially optimal FTM termination charges
would depend on the magnitude of network externalities, the intensity of competition in
the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. Armstrong and Wright
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(2009) integrate the above two streams of literature into a unifying model and analyze the
impact of introducing a uniform (FTM and MTM) termination charge. They show that
imposing uniform access charges (set either unilaterally or cooperatively) leads mobile
networks to set a termination charge below the monopoly level but above the level that
they would set if MTM termination could be priced separately.
Still, there is no academic publication considering the issue of integration between
fixed and mobile networks and the pricing incentives for on-net and off-net calls. The
papers closest to ours are Cambini (2001), who considers vertical integration between
local and long-distance communications providers and the resulting problems of one-
way wholesale access (there is no corresponding retail pricing analysis, though), and Mu
(2008), who analyzes symmetric competition between two pairs of integrated fixed and
mobile networks and the necessity of regulating mobile termination rates. The latter
paper does find that the integrated firm internalizes termination payments, i.e. does not
take termination rates into account when setting its retail prices for calls between its
parts, but neglects the decisive issues of asymmetric mobile market outcomes and call
externalities.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section
3 presents the retail pricing equilibrium in our benchmark case, i.e., the case in which
networks are non-integrated, while in Section 4 we study equilibrium outcomes when the
fixed and a mobile network are integrated. In Section 5 we propose potential regulatory
remedies to limit the negative impact of integration on market outcomes. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Model Setup
Networks, costs and tariffs. Consider a mobile telephony market with two poten-
tially asymmetric networks. Mobile network 1 is owned by the monopoly fixed network,
while mobile network 2 is independent. We assume that consumers in the mobile and
fixed markets fall into different groups. Competition in the mobile market is modeled in
Hotelling fashion as in Laffont et al. (1998), while networks are asymmetric as in Carter
and Wright (1999) and Hoernig (2007). The fixed network’s retail prices are unregulated.
For simplicity, we only consider the fixed network’s choice of FTM price and monthly
subscription fee.4 All networks are interconnected and terminate incoming calls charging
termination rates which are set by the sectoral regulator. The central assumption that
we make is that mobile network 1 and the fixed network choose their retail tariffs jointly.
There is a mass 1 of consumers in the mobile market, and a mass N of consumers in
the fixed market. Mobile market shares are αi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, with αi + αj = 1, where
network j generically denotes network i’s rival. Mobile networks have symmetric costs
and termination rates.5 Each mobile network incurs a monthly fixed cost per customer
f and has on-net call costs of c = co + ct per minute, where co and ct are its origination
and termination cost, respectively. The regulated mobile termination rate is denoted by
a, and therefore, the per-minute cost of an off-net call to the other mobile network is
co + a. The fixed network has a monthly fixed cost of fx, and its per-minute costs of an
FTM call to either mobile network are cxo + a, where cxo is its origination cost. Note
that we assume, as in Armstrong and Wright (2009), that the termination charge both
for MTM and FTM calls is uniform, that is, independent of the call’s origin. Similarly,
4Free calls to other fixed network customers are often included in the monthly subscription. We
therefore assume that FTF calls are free.
5A higher termination rate on network 2 would amplify the effects described below.
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the per-minute cost of an MTF call is co + ax, where ax is the fixed network’s regulated
termination rate.
Mobile network i offers a multi-part tariff (Fi, pi, p̂i, p̃i) which consists of a monthly
fixed fee Fi, and of per-minute prices pi for on-net calls, p̂i for off-net calls to the other
mobile network, and p̃i for calls to the fixed network. The fixed network offers a multi-
part tariff (Fx, z1, z2) comprising a fixed fee Fx and per-minute call prices z1 and z2 to
mobile networks 1 and 2, respectively.
Consumers and market shares. We assume that each mobile or fixed subscriber
makes calls to all potential recipients with equal probability. Mobile subscribers receive
a fixed utility Ai from being connected to network i, with A1 ≥ A2. Fixed subscribers
obtain a fixed utility Ax from subscription to the fixed network.6 Subscribers also obtain
utility u(q) from making and γu(q) from receiving a call of length q, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
indicates the strength of the call externality. The corresponding caller net surplus at price
p is v(p) = maxq{u(q)− pq}, with call demand q(p) = −v′(p). Let qi = q(pi), q̂i = q(p̂i),
etc., and similarly for v and u. Finally, we define qxi = q(zi), u
x
i = u(q
x
i ) and v
x
i = v(zi).
For a given mobile consumer, the surplus of subscribing to mobile network i = 1, 2,
apart from the fixed utility Ai, is given by
wi = αi (vi + γui) + αj (v̂i + γûj) +N (ṽi + γu
x
i )− Fi
= αihii + αjhij +Nhix − Fi.
6Alternatively, one could assume that fixed subscribers are heterogenous, and then derive a
downward-sloping demand curve. This would lead to the same conclusions about call prices as in the
present setting.
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The Hotelling market share of network i is then
αi =
1
2
+ σ (wi + Ai − wj − Aj) ,
where σ > 0 measures the strength of horizontal differentiation. Solving this implicit
condition for the market share αi leads to
αi =
1/2 + σ (hij − hjj +N (hix − hjx) + Ai − Aj − Fi + Fj)
1− σH , (1)
where H ≡ hii + hjj − hji − hij.7
A consumer in the fixed market with connection utility Ax subscribes if his net surplus
is non-negative, that is, if
Ax + wx = Ax + α1 (v
x
1 + γũ1) + α2 (v
x
2 + γũ2)− Fx ≥ 0. (2)
We assume that Ax is large enough so that in equilibrium the fixed network is active.
Profits and welfare. Mobile network i’s profits are given by
πi = αi (Fi − f) + α2i (pi − c) qi + αiαj [(p̂i − co − a) q̂i + (a− ct) q̂j]
+αiN [(p̃i − co − ax) q̃i + (a− ct) qxi ] . (3)
The first two terms contain the profits from subscriptions and on-net calls, whereas the
third and fourth terms represent the profits from off-net call origination and termination
to the other mobile and fixed network, respectively.
7We assume that H < 1/σ, so that the equilibrium candidate is stable in customer expectations (see
Laffont, Rey and Tirole 1998).
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The fixed network’s profits are
πx = N (Fx − fx) +
∑
i=1,2
αiN [(zi − cxo − a) qxi + (ax − cxt) q̃i] . (4)
Finally, consumer surplus is given by
CS =
∑
i=1,2
[
αi (wi + Ai)−
α2i
4σ
]
+N (wx + Ax) ,
where the negative term represents the total Hotelling transportation costs, and total
welfare is
W = CS + π1 + π2 + πx.
In the following we will consider Nash equilibria where all three networks choose their
tariffs simultaneously. To begin with, we provide a benchmark where network 1 and the
fixed network are not jointly owned, i.e. set prices independently. Then, in a second step
we consider the Nash equilibrium under integration, where the fixed network and mobile
network 1 maximize their joint profits, πx + π1. In a last step, we revisit the equilibria
when remedies have been imposed.
3 A Benchmark: Non-Integrated Networks
As a first step, we determine market outcomes with separately owned networks. In this
benchmark, all three networks choose their tariffs simultaneously and independently to
maximize their respective profits, taking the other networks’tariffs as given.
For the fixed market, the fixed network sets the subscription fee Fx such that condition
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(2) holds with equality, hence,
Fx = Ax + α1 (v
x
1 + γũ1) + α2 (v
x
2 + γũ2) . (5)
Substituting Fx into the profits (4) and dropping the terms that do not depend on the
FTM call prices, the fixed network chooses z1 and z2 to maximize
∑
i=1,2
αi [v
x
i + (zi − cxo − a) qxi ] .
Using the fact that dvxi /dzi = −qxi , the maximum is obtained at
zN1 = z
N
2 = cxo + a, (6)
that is, without integration FTM calls are priced at marginal cost.8 The intuition behind
this result is that the fixed network only considers its own callers and profits. Otherwise
stated, it does not take into account externalities on receivers and mobile networks.
Mobile networks, on the other hand, choose their optimal call prices while keeping
surplus wi (and therefore market shares) constant, by adjusting fixed fees Fi accordingly.
Optimal call prices are therefore found by substituting Fi from the market share equation
(1) into the profits (3), and by isolating the relevant terms. For the on-net call price,
network i therefore maximizes
vi + γui + (pi − c) qi.
Using the fact that dui/dpi = piq′i, we obtain the solution p
N
i = c/ (1 + γ). As is well-
8In the following, superscripts N and I refer to non-integration and integration, respectively.
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known, for on-net calls the call externality is fully internalized and the mobile networks
optimally choose the effi cient price level. The price for off-net calls to the other mobile
network p̂i is found by maximizing
αj [v̂i + (p̂i − co − a) q̂i]− αiγûi.
As in Jeon et al. (2004), the resulting off-net price is
p̂Ni =
co + a
1− γαi/αj
. (7)
This off-net MTM price is strategically distorted upwards due to the positive externality
that subscribers of the rival network obtain when they receive a call.
Finally, the MTF call price is set in order to maximize
ṽi + (p̃i − co − ax) q̃i.
This expression again does not contain any externality term. Thus, the MTF price is
also set at marginal cost,
p̃Ni = co + ax. (8)
Finally, we determine the equilibrium fixed fees and the resulting market shares. First,
note that from (1) we have
∂αi
∂Fi
= − 1
1/σ −H . (9)
The first-order condition for maximizing mobile network i’s profits πi with respect to Fi
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leads to fixed fees and profits
FNi = f +
αi
σ
− αiH − 2αiPNi − (1− 2αi) P̂Ni −NP̃Ni , (10)
πNi = α
2
i
[
1
σ
−H − PNi + P̂Ni
]
, (11)
with PNi =
(
pNi − c
)
qi, P̂Ni =
(
p̂Ni − co − a
)
q̂i+(a− ct) q̂j, and P̃Ni =
(
p̃Ni − co − ax
)
q̃i+
(a− ct) qxi being profits from incoming and outgoing calls. The fixed fee decreases in the
FTM profit P̃i, which means that the "waterbed effect" is at play, i.e. the phenomenon
that profits from fixed-to-mobile termination are handed on to consumers through a
lower monthly fee.9 Since this waterbed effect is full here, mobile networks’profits are
not affected. Furthermore, the equilibrium prices computed above imply that hix = hjx,
and together with P̃i = P̃j, we obtain that market shares (1) do not depend on the
presence of the fixed network under non-integration.
In the case where subscription surpluses A1 and A2 are identical, we obtain a sym-
metric equilibrium where αi = 1/2 and πNi = π
N
j . In the following we will compare these
outcomes to those obtained under integration.
4 Integrated Networks
4.1 Equilibrium tariffs
Now we assume that mobile network 1 and the fixed network are integrated. The fixed
network has no influence on the independent mobile network’s pricing decisions, so net-
9The waterbed effect has some empirical relevance, as shown by Genakos and Valletti (2011). In
particular, their results suggest that, although regulation in Europe reduced termination rates by about
10% to the benefit of callers to mobile phones from fixed lines, it also led to a 5% increase (varying
between 2%-15% depending on the estimate) in mobile retail prices.
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work 2 continues to set the on-net price pI2 = c/(1 + γ), MTF price p̃
I
2 = co + ax and
MTM off-net price p̂I2, given by (7) for new equilibrium market shares. On the other
hand, network 1 and the fixed network maximize the sum of their fixed and mobile prof-
its, π1 + πx. Holding market shares fixed and substituting F1 and Fx as above, we find
that mobile on-net and off-net prices are set as above, that is, pI1 = c/(1 + γ) and p̂
I
1 is
as in (7). What does change, though, are the relevant terms for determining the prices
of FTM calls to either mobile network and the MTF calls of network 1.
The optimal MTF call price p̃1 is found by maximizing
ṽ1 + (p̃1 − co − ax) q̃1 + γũ1 + (ax − cxt) q̃1 = ṽ1 + (p̃1 − co − cxt) q̃1 + γũ1.
Two externalities are internalized in this choice: first, the termination payment; and
second, the receiver utility. Thus, the relevant marginal costs are the origination cost on
the mobile network and the termination cost on the fixed network. Network 1’s strategic
marginal cost is even lower, since it also internalizes the call externality. The resulting
MTF price is at the effi cient level,
p̃I1 =
co + cxt
1 + γ
. (12)
This price is lower than the MTF price without integration for two reasons: First, mar-
ginal cost contains the termination cost cxt and not the potentially higher termination
rate ax; second, the integrated network takes into account that receivers of these calls are
also its clients; by lowering the MTF price it creates more surplus if γ > 0, which can
then be extracted through higher fixed fees.
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As concerns FTM calls, those to network 1 are priced in order to maximize
α1 (γu
x
1 + (a− ct) qx1 + vx1 + (z1 − cxo − a) qx1 ) (13)
= α1 (v
x
1 + (z1 − cxo − ct) qx1 + γux1) .
Exactly the same two externalities are internalized in this case, so the optimal FTM price
for calls to the partner mobile network becomes
zI1 =
cxo + ct
1 + γ
. (14)
Again, this FTM price is lower than without integration since ct ≤ a and γ > 0.
On the other hand, the terms relevant for the FTM price of calls to network 2 are
α2 [v
x
2 + (z2 − cxo − a) qx2 ]− α1γux2 , (15)
which now contains the strategic marginal cost of network 2’s clients receiving calls from
the fixed network. Taking these into account leads to
zI2 =
cxo + a
1− γα1/α2
, (16)
which shows that the incentives for off-net FTM pricing are identical to those for off-net
MTM pricing in (7). Compared to (6), the FTM price to the non-integrated network is
distorted upwards. Furthermore, it continues to be based on the mobile termination rate
instead of the lower mobile termination cost.
Finally, network 2’s fixed fee F I2 is formally identical to (10). The integrated network,
on the other hand, solves maxF1,Fx {πx + π1} subject to fixed users’surplus being non-
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negative. After substituting Fx from (5), we can compute the first-order condition for F1
and solve it for
F I1 = f +
α1
σ
− α1H − 2α1P1 − (1− 2α1) P̂1 −NP̃1 (17)
−N {(vx1 + γũ1 + Z1)− (vx2 + γũ2 + Z2)} ,
where Zi ≡ (zi − cxo − a) qxi +(ax − cxt) q̃i are the fixed network’s profits from calls to and
from mobile network i. The first line of F I1 is formally identical to the fixed fee (10). The
second line describes how a change in mobile market shares affects the fixed network’s
profits: A higher fixed fee loses a marginal customer to the other mobile network, which
implies the substitution of the corresponding FTM call profits. Put differently, the loss of
FTM profits related to network 1 constitutes an opportunity cost, while the gain related
to network 2 provides a corresponding benefit. The net effect on the fixed fee of the
integrated network depends on which of the two is larger.
4.2 Market outcomes
We now determine the effect of the integrated networks’ equilibrium tariff choices on
market shares and profits. We first study whether the integrated mobile network gains
an advantage over the non-integrated one due to integration, and second how this affects
their respective profits. As an additional step, we analyze whether integration amplifies
or dampens any initial asymmetry between networks.
Concerning market shares and profits, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Compared to the Nash equilibrium without integration, the integrated mo-
bile network has a higher equilibrium market share. The difference increases in the size
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of the fixed market N and the strength of the call externality γ.
Proof. Holding for now market shares and therefore off-net call prices and H =
hii + hjj − hji − hij fixed at the non-integrated level H̄, expression (1) results in a new
estimate for the market share of firm 1, that is,
α′1 =
1/2 + σ
(
h12 − h22 +N (h1x − h2x) + A1 − A2 − F I1 + F I2
)
1− σH̄
.
After substituting the fixed fee in the equilibrium under integration, and denoting the
total welfare from an exchange of calls between the fixed network and mobile network i
by
Wi = hix + v
x
i + γũi + P̃i + Zi
= (ṽi + γũi) + (v
x
i + γu
x
i ) + (p̃i − co − cxt) q̃i + (zi − cxo − ct) qxi ,
we obtain
α′1 =
N (W1 −W2)
1/σ − H̄
+ const,
where the terms in const do not depend on MTF or FTM prices. Since p̃1 and z1 are
lowered from marginal cost (including the termination rate) to the effi cient level and p̃2
and z2 are raised from cost to an even higher level, W1 −W2 increases, and thus α′1 lies
above the non-integrated market share. Since under stability there is a unique equilibrium
market share, this implies that in the integrated equilibrium network 1’s (network 2’s)
market share rises (decreases). This effect increases inN . Furthermore,W1−W2 increases
in γ since in W1 prices are effi ciently set and in W2 they become increasingly distorted.
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The difference in market shares increases in the strength of the call externality γ and
the size of the fixed customer base N . Integration has an effect even for γ = 0, because
the integrated network charges a lower FTM price due to the internalization of the mobile
termination rate.
An additional issue of interest is whether pricing under integration amplifies or reduces
ex-ante asymmetries, and how it affects profits.
Proposition 2 If the strength of call externality γ is small, then in the Nash equilibrium
under integration:
1. Any ex-ante market share asymmetry in favour of the integrated firm is magnified.
2. The non-integrated rival’s profits decrease.
Proof. 1. First we establish that for small γ the term H has a local minimum at
α1 = 1/2 and is quasiconvex. The Taylor expansion of dH/dα1 around γ = 0 is
dH
dα1
= γ (co + a) q(co + a)
(
1
(1− α1)2
− 1
α21
)
+O(γ2)
The first term cuts the horizontal axis from below and equals zero at α̂1 = 1/2. This
implies that if γ is small then H has a unique stationary point, which is a local minimum
at α̂1. Therefore H is quasiconvex.
Second, since A1 > A2, the market share α1 is above 1/2 before integration, and
increases further after integration. We conclude that H increases with α1, and therefore
also (1− σH)−1 in (1), which is the multiplier of the surplus difference A1 − A2.
2. Network 2’s profits are given by πN2 = α
2
2
[
1/σ −H − PN2 + P̂N2
]
. Both the factor
α22 and P̂
N
2 decrease (the latter due to lower call and termination profits) andH increases,
thus πN2 falls.
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It is now possible to determine the equilibrium profit of the integrated firm, π1 + πx.
Using (5) and (17), we obtain
πI = π1 + πx = α
2
1
[
1
σ
−H − P1 + P̂1
]
+N [Ax − fx + vx2 + γũ2 + Z2] .
Given that termination payments are internalized, the equilibrium profit is equal to the
MTM profit (first component) plus the value (utility plus profit) generated from FTM
calls to the non-integrated mobile operator 2.
From this expression for the integrated profits, we can easily conclude what level for
FTM termination charges (as opposed to MTM ones) the integrated network will prefer.
This question needs to be seen on the background that non-integrated fixed networks
prefer very low termination rates because they constitute a cost, while mobile networks
prefer very high FTM termination rates. How will this conflict of interest be resolved
under integration?
Corollary 1 The integrated networks prefer a zero FTM termination rate over a positive
one.
Proof. Since d (vx2 + γũ2 + Z2) /da = −qx2 if z2 is chosen optimally, the integrated
network’s profits are decreasing in a.
The intuition for this result is that the integrated equilibrium profits do not depend
on profits related to traffi c between the two integrated networks because termination
payments cancel out. On the other hand, for the same reason, the effect of traffi c to the
other mobile network is reinforced, through the adjusted fixed fee (17). To be precise,
what the integrated network actually prefers is a low FTM termination rate on its rival
network, while it is indifferent about this rate on its mobile arm.
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5 Potential Remedies
In this section we consider two potential remedies, in case the effects of integration out-
lined above are considered market failures: i) an obligation to set uniform FTM prices,
i.e., the integrated fixed network must charge the same FTM price for calls to either
mobile network; ii) functional separation, at the retail pricing level, between the inte-
grated fixed and mobile businesses, i.e., FTM and MTF prices would have to be set as if
networks were not integrated.
It is immediately clear that functional separation reproduces the retail pricing outcome
without integration, that is, z1 = z2 = cxo + a as in (6) and p̃i = co + ax as in (8). While
this obligation establishes the call pricing structure without integration, it foregoes the
benefits from the internalization of the termination rates that arises under integration.
Let us now consider uniform FTM pricing. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 If a uniform FTM price is imposed, in equilibrium it will be set equal to
the average network cost, internalizing the integrated mobile network’s termination rate:
zU = cxo + α1ct + α2a. (18)
Proof. Under the obligation to set z2 = z1 ≡ zU , the fixed network maximizes the
sum of the terms depending on z1 and z2 in (13) and (15), that is,
α1 (v
x
1 + (z1 − cxo − ct) qx1 + γux1) + α2 [vx2 + (z2 − cxo − a) qx2 ]− α1γux2
= vU +
(
zU − cxo − α1ct − α2a
)
qU ,
from which the above result follows directly.
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Two observations are in order. First, just as with pricing of calls between mobile
networks, under a uniform price the call externalities do not matter and therefore do
not influence equilibrium pricing. Second, the resulting FTM price is below the non-
integration one, due to a lower average network cost. As a result of this remedy, the
FTM price towards the integrated mobile network increases by relatively little from zI1
to zU , while the FTM price to the other mobile network decrease more strongly from zI2
to zU . Thus, total welfare should be expected to increase when this remedy is imposed.
6 Conclusions
Integration between fixed and mobile operators is typical of many national communica-
tions markets. In this paper we analyze the impact of fixed-mobile integration on retail
pricing incentives, which is a rather unexplored issue in the literature.
We show that FTM calls to rival mobile networks will be priced significantly above
marginal cost, while those to the integrated mobile network will be priced below cost.
Our results show that this pricing structure creates an additional disadvantage for non-
integrated mobile networks, in terms of market shares and profits, and even magnifies
existing asymmetries. On the policy side, we find that the potential remedy of imposing
a uniform pricing constraint on FTM prices leads to a significantly more effi cient pricing
structure, which is also better than the alternative remedy of function separation.
Our framework is suitable to be extended in different directions. First, it is possible
to extend the analysis considering fixed-to-mobile substitution. The latter can occur at
the level of calls if consumers subscribe to both a fixed and a mobile network (Armstrong
and Wright, 2009), or at the level of access, i.e. consumers decide about which and how
many networks to subscribe to. Fixed-mobile integration may also imply that consumers
20
are offered bundles involving both fixed and mobile services, which should be analyzed by
introducing bundling strategies into a network competition framework. Both extensions
are dealt with in our companion papers.
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Appendix: Integrated Incumbents in the EU15
In the following table we report the historical fixed-line incumbent operators in each
country of the EU15, as well as their mobile subsidiary and its respective market share.
In the last column we also report the number of mobile network operators (MNOs) which
are active in each country. The data are drawn from the Telecom Market Matrix, Merrill
Lynch/Bank of America (April 2012).
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